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Chapter 7 
Psychological and Ethical Issues in Third Party Assisted Conception and Surrogate 
Motherhood 
 
Olga van den Akker BSc PhD. 
Professor of Health Psychology 




The continuing increase in babies born via third party assisted conception (AC) and surrogate 
motherhood across the world shows the success of -and medical and social demand for -third 
party interventions in family building. However, with the increasing use of such interventions 
world-wide, commercialisation and commodification have proliferated. This in turn has led to 
inequality in access to AC services, in choice of third party input, and in questionable human 
rights and psychosocial welfare issues. Transitioning to parenthood using third party AC and 
surrogate motherhood, in addition to requiring equality in access, also demand accuracy of 
birth and genetic information. In the absence of accurate record keeping, continuing practices 
of anonymity, and marginalization of the contribution of donors and surrogates, psychological, 
social, health and ethical questions are raised for donors, recipients and potentially for (genetic, 




The transition to parenthood is one of the most important milestones in an individual’s life 
which for some can be associated with a huge amount of distress and discomfort. The 
experience of traumatic events pre-pregnancy (when an individual realizes s/he cannot 
conceive; when a pregnancy is not yet desired; when a conception fails), or during pregnancy 
(such as miscarriages, foetal abnormalities or death) and post-delivery (such as neonatal death, 
delivery trauma, post-natal depression or psychosis) can be life changing (van den Akker, 
2012). These life changing experiences, many of which are described in the chapters within 
this book, can also be experienced during AC treatment which in itself is known to be 
psychologically taxing for many individuals experiencing it (Domar, 2015). AC using third 
party input such as mitochondrial, gamete, embryo donation and surrogacy add another layer 
of complexity. 
Third party assisted conception 
Third party AC requires the assistance of a donor or surrogate and a team of professionals 
to bring about a pregnancy. It refers to a number of AC treatments and processes which includes 
another person’s (the third party’s) mitochondria, gametes or embryo and or a contracted 
surrogate mother to carry a genetic or gestational pregnancy to term for another person (van 
den Akker, 2012, 2017). This chapter is concerned with gamete donation and surrogate 
motherhood, although some of the issues addressed also apply to the more recent practices of 
mitochondrial donation, (where the mother’ faulty mitochondrial DNA is removed from her 
egg and replaced with healthy mitochondria from a donor egg). The amount of third party 
input necessary in building a family for recipients varies and is shown in Figure 1. It also 
potentially relates to the loss of third party input or potential family members in those providing 
the third party input (Purewal & van den Akker, 2007). 
Figure 1: The amount of third party genetic and gestational input provided and lost via third 
party AC, ranging from a pregnancy and oocytes belonging to the surrogate to at the other end 
of the scale, the addition of only third party mitochondria.  
 
Demand 
Across the world in 2010, an estimated 48.5 million couples worldwide were unable to have 
a child after five years of trying (Mascarenhas, Flaxman, Boema, Vanderpoel, & Stevens, 
2012) with many of them stigmatised in their communities (see for example, Bos et al., Chapter 
4 in this volume). The demand for AC stems from the continuing desire for babies, preferably 
with a genetic or gestational link (van den Akker, 2007), and is also due to increasing numbers 
of individuals seeking AC against biological and social odds, such as women and men who are 
older, single or in same sex relationships (Carone, Baiocco, & Lingiardi, 2017). AC family 
units, like adoptive families, require parents able to disclose the use of third parties in their 
conceptions to ensure their children have accurate genetic and gestational information. In single 
and same sex parenting third party AC involvement is generally more obvious, but in 
heterosexual couples this is not always the case. 
Open versus hidden practices 
Not all countries laws or their religions endorse third party AC practices. For example, 
Jewish religious authorities are generally ‘pronatalist and gladly accommodate AC 
technologies’ (Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2016, p16) whereas the Catholic Church although also pro-







In countries where third party AC is accepted it was (Barton, Walker, & Wiesner, 1945) and 
still is generally used for the benefit of the new parents with the genetic origins of the child 
never disclosed (Royal College of Obstetricians & Gynaecologists, 1987). Where third party 
AC is not accepted, people travel abroad and also often maintain secrecy about the child’s 
origins. Since few countries monitor the numbers or origins of surrogate arrangements and 
gamete / embryo donations, and no records exist, the concern for the wishes of the parent(s) is 
adequately addressed but the welfare of the child’s right to accurate genetic or gestational 
information is entirely ignored (Shidlow, 2011). In 2012, an Israeli public health committee 
recommended that since gay men and single women should be allowed to use a surrogate to 
have children, they also recommended non-anonymous sperm donation (Pritchard, 2012) as 
obviously single and same sex parents will have needed gametes and surrogates respectively. 
This marked a shift in line with other countries’ consideration for the welfare of the child -
albeit a relatively slow shift. Most countries continue to fail to consider the wider implications 
of third party AC on the donor or surrogate or on the person conceived. 
Disclosure 
Disclosure of information about third party assisted conception was recognised decades 
earlier by a number of other governments and sperm banks as more advantageous for the parties 
involved – including for the offspring (Blyth & Frith, 2015; Scheib, 2003), although some did 
not legislate for these changes until the turn of the century. Such changes in practice enabled 
donor-conceived individuals to understand their biogenetic (genetic/biological) information 
(Strathern, 2005), a part of their identity reported to be incomplete (van den Akker, Crawshaw, 
Blyth, & Frith, 2015; Frith, Crawshaw, van den Akker & Blyth, 2017), and also provided the 
opportunity for donors’ to learn about the outcomes of their donation (Blyth & Frith, 2015; 
Raes, Ravelingien, & Pennings, 2013).  
Access to accurate genetic information is increasingly important for health information 
(Harper, Kennett, & Reisel, 2016) and is a basic human right. The UK Government was the 
first to legislate for donors details and the outcomes of donations to be registered by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority in 1991 (HFEA, state regulator) (Blyth & Frith, 2015), 
giving donor-conceived individuals the right to request non-identifying donor information from 
the HFEA from age 18 and in 2004, all prospective donors were required to agree to disclosure 
of their identity (HFEA (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulations 2004/1511). In a study 
of 21 sperm and 5 egg donors who registered on a voluntary DNA register for donors and donor 
conceived adult offspring, disclosure of information was welcomed by donors for very personal 
reasons (Blyth, Crawshaw, Frith, & van den Akker, 2017) as shown in Figure 2. Family and 
identity also featured as reasons for disclosure for donor conceived adult offspring (van den 
Akker et al., 2015). 
Figure 2: Reasons for searching for genetic relatives (adapted from Blyth et al., 2017). 
 
Fragmented parenthood  
Unlike gamete or embryo donation, in surrogate motherhood, the traditional motherhood / 
parenthood functions are more fragmented with the surrogate contributing to the prenatal, and 
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contributions can have life-long health effects upon the surrogate child (EpiHealth, 2016). The 
surrogate mother becomes pregnant (through AC as a gestational surrogate, or through 
insemination as a genetic surrogate) and carries, and then delivers a baby for another, usually 
infertile woman, or for a single man or heterosexual or gay couple who cannot achieve a 
pregnancy (the recipient or commissioning couple). The baby is usually handed over to the 
commissioning recipient(s) immediately or soon after birth (Sharma, 2006), who then raise it 
as their own. In gestational surrogacy, using in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment the embryo 
is entirely genetically unrelated to the surrogate mother, and may be (partly or fully) related to 
the commissioning couple or donors, and is transferred into the surrogates’ uterus (American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, ACOG, 2008). The process requires medical 
intervention, and the resultant child could not exist without the explicit selection of gametes, 
the IVF process, the embryo transfer (ET) and the surrogate. In this case, the commissioning 
couple may be entirely genetically linked to the embryo or the embryo may come from donated 
gametes (ACOG, 2008), but the new intended couple were not involved in its gestation. The 
surrogate on the other hand, finds herself involved in a medical and technological conception, 
far removed from natural conception. The fragmentation of functions removes the historical 
reliability of motherhood; mater semper est (motherhood is always certain) is now no longer 
certain (van den Akker, 2017). Similar to the donor insemination trajectory, acceptability of 
surrogate motherhood is not universal. 
Legal parenthood  
In most countries, parenthood is legally attributed to biological/ birth motherhood because 
it was always certain, making the surrogate the legal mother. In gamete or embryo (and 
mitochondrial) donation, the ‘route’ to giving birth (origins of gametes/ embryos from a third 
party) has no legal position. Consequently, in mitochondrial / gamete / embryo donation legal 
parenthood is bestowed upon the person giving birth, even if neither, only one or part of one 
of the new parents donated their own genetic material. The resultant children may never find 
out their true genetic origins unless they are accurately informed. In surrogacy, the surrogate 
birth mother is usually the legal mother of the child. The new commissioning parent(s) may or 
may not have contributed some or all of their genes to the resultant child. These parents, in for 
example the UK, need to apply for parental responsibility of the child, even if it is entirely 
genetically related to them. Legal parenthood is therefore not based upon genetic but birth 
parenthood as shown in figures 3a and 3b. The implications for the offspring are many fold 
since birth records tend not to show the true genetic or gestational origins. Importantly, 
depending upon differing national laws, the genetic and or gestational difference brought about 
via third party reproduction continues to be hidden, marginalized or denied (van den Akker, 
2001; 2007). Parents create a new reality or script (Strathern, 2002) which has left many 
thousands of now grown up third party offspring with inaccurate family histories (Frith, Blyth, 
Crawshaw, & van den Akker, 2018).  
 











Figure 3b: Legal recipient parentage of third party conceived children in the UK 
 
* Until an application for parental responsibility is made 
Governments have a difficult task legislating for or against third party AC treatments as they 
need to consider current laws across many different departments (child welfare, human rights, 
birth registrations, legal parenthood, immigration, education and so on) and across different 
countries – each with their own complex national laws. In the USA the reproductive industry 
has been referred to as the ‘wild west’ of AC because of its ‘relatively lax and sparse regulation’ 
of third-party and AC transactions, as no federal legislation effectively regulates the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties involved including clinicians, intended parents, donors, 
surrogates, and donor-conceived children (Markens, 2016). In the UK on the other hand, many 
aspects of surrogacy have remained relatively unaltered over the course of several decades 
following the Brazier Committee in 1998 (Brazier, Campbell, & Golombok, 1998). The HFEA 
Act (2008) finally suggested changes to the ways legal parenthood can be ascribed in third 
party reproduction, taking into account changes to legal parentage for couples in civil 
partnerships and same sex relationships. Many countries still do not recognise any form of 
same sex relationships or for single men or women to wish to build a family, making cross 
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border AC even more difficult to legislate for. 
Commercialisation, commodification and inequalities  
Third party AC is expensive and time consuming, involving a range of medical interventions 
to obtain the gametes, create embryos ex-utero and implant these into the mother requesting 
these or into a surrogate mother. In most countries, these expensive and time consuming 
treatment processes are (with few exceptions such as Israel) not freely available to all who need 
it. Third party AC and surrogacy are therefore generally only available to those who can afford 
these, which has led to substantial inequalities in access to these services world-wide. Such 
inequalities compound the marginalisation and stigmatisation of individuals who cannot have 
children (Inhorn & Serour, 2011; van den Akker, 2017). In countries offering commercially 
available third party reproduction the resultant children are therefore socially the children from 
relatively affluent parents. Genetically or gestationally they are the children of less affluent or 
extremely poor parents. The inequalities in access pose breaches in human rights and liberties. 
It also paves the way for the commodification of commissioning children, based upon the 
perceived quality of the donors and surrogates. Commercialisation and commodification open 
up opportunities for market forces delivering babies according to demand, a demand led by 
purchase preferences. It is unethical to treat human beings as resources to satisfy another 
person’s interests (Orlov & Orlov, 2007) in the same way as it is unethical to partake in people 
trafficking, sexual exploitation or organ trafficking (Wilkinson, 2003). Some of these practices 
are known to exist under the pretence of surrogacy (van den Akker, 2017). Finally, 
commodification via eugenics or genetic selection of the perfect offspring (Pande, 2016) is also 
unethical. 
International commercialization 
As surrogacy, gamete and embryo donation are not permitted in some countries, cross 
border opportunities offer an alternative route to obtaining a new born baby through surrogacy 
or to selecting gametes and embryos for own use (Ruiz-Robledillo & Moya-Albiol, 2016). It 
is always a commercial arrangement. Permissive laws, excellent English speaking clinics and 
cheaper services make cross border options attractive to Western individuals (Kumar, Inder, & 
Sharma, 2013). Commercial cross border surrogates such as those available in India, Thailand 
and Cambodia have been popular in the last decade, although new laws now prohibit Western 
couples’ access to these surrogates. The Indian Surrogacy Bill 2016 for example proposed a 
ban on gay, foreign and unmarried couples and single people from using Indian surrogates. 
This proposed law, assumes Indian surrogates are not in control. It also discriminates against 
gay and single people (BBC, 2016). To date, it is estimated that more than 25,000 babies have 
been born through surrogacy arrangements in India many commissioned by Western 
commissioning couples (Shetty, 2012). The complexity of bringing home babies commissioned 
in another country (Crawshaw, Blyth, & van den Akker, 2012) add further fuel to the ethical 
and moral rights and wrongs of inequalities between the developed and developing nations. It 
potentially allows for the masking of the trafficking and buying of babies and the using and 
exploitation of poor women by those with substantially more wealth. Participating in 
arrangements which have been likened to baby ‘factories’ or ‘farms’ where poor (or abducted) 
women live to produce babies (Kroløkke & Pant, 2012; Kumar et al., 2013; Riggs & Due, 
2010; van den Akker, 2017) cannot be condoned. Future generations resulting from such 
origins may wonder about the human costs of their conception. 
Epigenetic influences 
Individuals conceived via surrogacy particularly if donor gametes are used, may also have 
been conceived under financially determined conditions, or via malpractice on behalf of 
unscrupulous brokers, donors, surrogates or clinics. Recently, a donor who was registered as 
‘handsome and healthy, with several degrees and a genius-level IQ’ was in fact exposed as a 
convicted criminal and college dropout with schizophrenia. The 36 children born from his 
sperm were therefore at a genetic risk for schizophrenia (Stapleton, 2016 CNN news). The 
importance of genetics is increasingly relevant to third party reproduction. However, the 
importance of epigenetic influences - factors relating to the developing embryo’s 
developmental flexibility to its environment including the quantity and quality of nutrient 
availability and the embryo/foetus’s compensatory responses interacting with the delivery of 
the needs for the foetus (EpiHealth, 2016) – are not yet sufficiently considered in third party 
AC research, policy and practice.  
Research into the outcome of genetic and gestational surrogate pregnancies considers the 
importance of pregnancy and live birth rates. Little attention is paid to the effects of the clinical 
‘in vitro’ route to the pregnancy (Gardner & Lane, 2004) or the psychological state and 
physiological competence of the surrogate mother during the pregnancy which will contribute 
to determining the growth and wellbeing of the foetus. Surrogates are known not to attach to 
the foetus and their health behaviours, including drug, alcohol, dietary, smoking and exercise 
behaviours during the pregnancy will influence the foetus’s epigenetic health and future 
wellbeing.  
Although it is reassuring to know that malformations in gestational surrogate babies are 
comparable to those reported in the general population (Parkinson, Tran, Tan, Nelson, & 
Serafini, 1999) infertile couples using IVF or ICSI are at a greater risk of a number of adverse 
outcomes (Yeung et al., 2016). Premature deliveries (Koudstaal et al., 2000), pregnancy 
complications and low birthweight babies (Schieve et al., 2002) have been reported. It is not 
yet known if factors related to the IVF techniques or prenatal factors are responsible for these 
adverse outcomes, since adverse outcomes are reportedly lower after surrogate pregnancies 
(Schieve et al., 2002). On the other hand, there is an association between oocyte donation and 
low birthweight, pregnancy complications and caesarean sections (Savasi et al., 2016). Since 
gestational surrogates undergo embryo transfer with ‘donated’ oocytes (from the 
commissioning mother or a donor) these pregnancies are likely to be at the same risks as oocyte 
recipients and their babies in IVF treated cycles. Finally, psychologically, not bonding with the 
foetus in pregnancy may benefit a surrogate and make the relinquishment easier (van den Akker, 
2003; 2007), but the foetus is influenced by her (the surrogate’s) behaviours and mental state. 
Some surrogates’ behaviours may therefore have consequences for the developing foetus 
(Egliston, McMahon, & Austin, 2007; Ombelet, De Sutter, Van der Elst, & Martens, 2005) and 
these effects are under investigated in general (Purewal, Chapman, & van den Akker, 2017) 
and in surrogacy in particular.  
Welfare issues  
Surrogate motherhood may disadvantage the child or surrogate mother (Agnafors, 2014), 
and ethical and legal complications have been reported in surrogate motherhood arrangements 
(Brinsden, 2003). There are also numerous reports indicating surrogates experience of 
surrogacy tends to be positive rather than negative and separation from the child is generally 
problem free. Neither do surrogate mothers show major psychological problems following the 
surrogacy arrangement (Jadva, Murray, Lycett, MacCallum, & Golombok, 2003; MacCallum, 
Lycett, Murray, Jadva, & Golombok, 2003; Ruiz-Robledillo & Moya-Albiol, 2016; 
Söderström-Anttila et al., 2016; van den Akker, 2003). Surrogate mothers are even reported to 
be empowered by the process (DasGupta & Dasgupta, 2014). Altruistic surrogates in particular, 
are happy with their choice and felt empowered by their surrogate experiences (Blyth, 1994; 
van den Akker, 2005). They reject some of the commodification arguments and assert their 
right to decide what to do with their own body (Bromfield, 2016). In Western contexts the main 
reasons that lead women to become altruistic surrogate mothers are not primarily financial, but 
a relatively altruistic desire to help others (Imrie & Jadva, 2014; Markens, 2012; van den Akker, 
2003), although they do receive payment which they acknowledge as important.  
Gestational surrogate children’s psychological adjustment does not differ from naturally 
conceived children and the lack of the genetic / gestational link between the commissioning 
parent(s) and their child(ren) does not impact negatively upon parent–child relationships (Bos 
& van Balen, 2010; Golombok et al., 2006; Golombok et al., 2011; Ruiz-Robledillo & Moya-
Albiol, 2016; Shelton et al., 2009). There is some evidence that adjustment problems have been 
reported in surrogate children compared to children born through gamete donation (Golombok, 
Blake, Casel, Roman, & Jadva, 2012). Importantly, the surrogate’s own children do not 
experience negative consequences after their mother's surrogate pregnancy and relinquishment 
of the baby in altruistic surrogacy (Jadva & Imrie, 2014). It is probable that support for all 
involved in third party AC is likely to be necessary in the foreseeable future, particularly where 
non-disclosure has been practiced (Crawshaw, Frith, van den Akker, & Blyth, 2016). 
Summary 
The competing interests and interactions between legal, organizational, health, personal, 
social, psychological and cultural issues in transitioning to non-biological and non-genetic 
parenthood are under explored. Third party assisted reproductive healthcare and surrogate 
motherhood services result in the creation of families with part or full genetic and gestational 
difference from the parent(s) seeking the services. Genetic and gestational differences in these 
families are often hidden. At the other end of the spectrum, biological and genetic (half) siblings 
and grandparents with partial or full genetic and gestational similarity are in too many cases 
denied knowledge of and nearly always, denied contact with the third party offspring. The 
psychological adaptation required to changes in public opinions, technology and legislation in 
third party reproduction and surrogate motherhood impacts at individual, societal and global 
levels. The evidence that some donors, surrogates, recipients and offspring demonstrate 
conflict or dissonance about their involvement in third party conception indicates a need to 
address these concerns in future research, policy and practice.  
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